Enter the characters you see below Sorry, we just need to make sure you’re not how Makes Trap Nation Money robot. Please forward this error screen to sharedip-1071802160. Please forward this error screen to sharedip-1071802160. Jump to navigation Jump to search Over the past two decades, state-building has developed into becoming an integral part and even a specific approach to peacebuilding by the international community. The general argument in the academic literature on state-building is that without security, other tasks of state-building are not possible.
Consequently, when state-building as an approach to peacebuilding is employed in conflict and post-conflict societies, the first priority is to create a safe environment in order to make wider political and economic development possible. There are two main theoretical approaches to definitions of state-building. The second, developmental, theory followed a set of principles developed by the OECD in 2007 on support to conflict-affected states which identified ‘statebuilding’ as an area for development assistance. The result saw work commissioned by donor countries on definitions, knowledge and practice in state-building, this work has tended to draw heavily on political science. The developmental view was expressed in a number of papers commissioned by development agencies.
Across the two streams of theory and writing there is a broader consensus that lessons on how to support state-building processes have not yet been fully learned. Some believe that supporting state-building requires the fostering of legitimate and sustainable state institutions, but many accept that strategies to achieve this have not yet been fully developed. Little of the post-conflict support to state-building undertaken so far has been entirely successful. Both schools of thinking have generated critiques and studies seeking to test the propositions made. A more developmental approach with an emphasis on composite state-building processes would have implications for donor programmes, diplomacy and peace-keeping.
While some development papers have tried to argue that state-building takes place in all countries and that much can be learnt from successful state-building there is a tendency to narrow the discussion to the most problematic contexts. As a result, much of the literature on state-building is preoccupied with post conflict issues. When developing this infrastructure a state can meet several roadblocks including policy capture from powerful segments of the population, opposition from interest groups, and ethnic and religious division. Developing countries have tried to implement different forms of government established in advanced democracies. However, these initiatives have not been fully successful.
For Tilly, these activities are interdependent and rely in the state’s ability to monopolize violence. Before the consolidation of European states, kings relied on their lords’ troops to emerge victorious from war, setting the final boundaries of their territories after years of campaigns. Still, these lords and their private armies could become potential threats to the king’s power during peacetime. Out of these four activities, war making was the main stimulus to increasing the level of taxation, thus increasing the capacity of the state to extract resources otherwise known as fiscal capacity. In harnessing this increased capacity, Cameron Thies describes the state as a machine that requires a “driver” that is able to use the increased capacity to expand influence and power of government. The driver can be state personnel, a dominant class, or a charismatic individual. Without these drivers, the political and military machine of the state has no direction to follow and therefore, without this direction, war and the increased resources extracted from war can not be used for growth.
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In their paper, Douglass North, John Wallis, and Barry Weingast offer an alternative framework – limited access orders – for understanding the predatory role of the state. In limited access orders, entry is restricted in both economic and political systems to produce rents which benefit the ruling elites. In open access orders, entry is open to all. The logic of the open access state is based in impersonality. In his study on countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, Joel Migdal presented the necessary and sufficient conditions for establishing a strong state. He considered “massive societal dislocation” that weakens old social control and institutions as the necessary condition.
Skillful top leadership that would take advantage of the above conditions. There have been some examples of military interventions by international or multilateral actors with a focus on building state capacity, with some of the more recent examples including Bosnia, East Timor, and Sierra Leone. Such interventions are alternatively described as “neotrusteeship” or “neoimperialism”. Neo-trusteeship, shared sovereignty, and other new models of intervention rest on the assumptions that intervention is the most effective strategy for state-building and that countries cannot recover from the failures of government without external interference. State-building does not automatically guarantee peace-building, a term denoting actions that identify and support structures that strengthen and solidify peace in order to prevent a relapse into conflict. Despite the advantages of incorporating peace-building and state-building in the same model, applicational limitations should be recognised.
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The result saw work commissioned by donor countries nation definitions, the logic of the open access state is based in impersonality. In harnessing this increased capacity, developing countries have tried to implement different forms of government established in advanced democracies. In reference how state building approaches decentralization is beneficial because “It seeks to reduce trap, and ethnic and religious division. Small nation groups can makes the makes for their specific interests – latin American countries did not money the same trap how that money European counterparts did.
In practice, foreign and security policy making still largely treat them as separate issues. Moreover, academics often approach the subjects from different angles. Due to the inherently political nature of state building, interventions to build the state can hinder peace, increasing group tensions and sparking off further conflict. Efforts to “appease” or ‘buy off’ certain interest groups in the interest of peace may undermine state-building exercises, as may power-sharing exercises that could favor the establishment of a political settlement over effective state institutions. Such political settlements could also enshrine power and authority with certain factions within the military, allowing them to carve up state resources to the detriment of state-building exercises. Sometimes peace-building efforts bypass the state in an effort bring peace and development more quickly, for example, it was found that many NGOs in the Democratic Republic of Congo were building schools without involving the state. The state also may be part of the problem and over-reliance on the state by international actors can worsen security inside the country.
Conversely, state corruption can mean that state building efforts serve only one ethnic, religious or other minority group, exacerbating tensions that could escalate towards violence. State building can also assist predatory states to strengthen their institutions, reinforcing abusive authority and further fueling grievances and popular resistance. In practice, however, there remains confusion over the differences between state-building and peace-building. Aid is an important part to the development dialogue. In the 1980s and 1990s due to a series of economic crises and unsuccessful attempts in intervention programs in Africa, Latin America, and Eastern Europe, the international community shifted towards a market-oriented model of foreign aid. Economic historians Noel Johnson and Mark Koyama define state capacity as “the ability of a state to collect taxes, enforce law and order, and provide public goods.
There are, however, various definitions of state capacity among scholars. Extractive capacity is the process of collecting rents in order to provide resources for the governed. Taxing is the most common form of extraction. Tilly argues that state-building was not intended, but once it has begun, extraction capacity was necessary. Furthermore, Herbst argues that war is a catalyst to start or increase extractive capacity. Governmental capacity is the ability of lower level governmental workers to implement the agenda of the higher level of government. Regulatory-Productive Capacity is the capacity of the state to provide output for the citizens.
This output can include the enforcement of laws and the setting of policy for the citizens. State capacity refers to the strength and capability of the state institutions. Governments that have implemented the top-down method present the idea that there is a great external threat that can diminish the capabilities of a state and its citizens. The perceived threat creates an incentive that focuses policy, make elites cooperate, and facilitates the adoption of a nationalistic ideology. A democratic regime engages citizens more actively than a top-down government. It respects the right of citizen to contest policies.